Ideologies and policies: redefining the society
There are countries in Europe for which membership in, let alone identification with Europe is now more of an issue than in the case of other states. This applies to the former Soviet-block countries of which Poland is an example. For Poland the best orientation point would be the 1 st of May 2004, i.e., the date of her accession to the European Union, to refrain from the possible, yet controversial alternatives of "entering" or "reentering" Europe.
Throughout her history Poland's place in Europe was a 'matter of degree'. At various times this view was entertained both within and outside of the country, with positive as well as negative connotations. It was stigmatized by Poland's own sense of pride and of victimization. Thus, Poland was (seen as) a "savage" borderland with Asia, a "protective buffer zone for Christianity" or a prison behind the "iron curtain". In the 17 th century Poland took credit for "salvaging" (Christian) Europe from the (Muslim) Asian flood following King Sobieski's victory at Vienna. After World War Two Poland felt abandoned by Europe to the Soviet "barbaric" regime. In the 1980's, in turn, Lech Wałęsa, the charismatic workers' leader, and the Solidarity movement initiated transformations that made possible today to talk about a new sense of Europe.
Polish élites have always looked West for intellectual and artistic inspiration. They also "went West", so that Paris for long epitomized the cultural Mecca of the rich and the cultured. At home Poland's Western roots had been traditionally cherished, and Latin and © Anna Duszak. Not for citation or distribution without permission of the author.
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French were prestige varieties in higher circles of the society. At the same time, however, the 
Ideologies and policies: redefining language
Ideologies, whether invited or imposed, normally come -and go -with a language. That was the situation of Russian in Polish, and so is the case with English at the moment. Poland's turn to the West, and her ensuing "new" europeanization is inalienably linked to the growing use of, and acceptance for English among wide sections of the Polish society.
To some extent ideologies define, and are defined themselves by attitudes to language.
This interaction of linguistic and non-linguistic values manifests itself in particular in asymmetrical power relations between languages (and cultures) in contact. As a regional, not to say a minority language, Polish has found itself on many occasions under the impact of a dominant language, to recall here the 'globalising' spread of Latin and French or the administrative imposition of Russian during the tsarist occupation and then under the Soviet regime. In some sense the recent invasion of English is therefore only a new form of linguistic "imperialism", so it is perhaps natural that it should invigorate the traditional protective attitudes to the Polish language.
At its very core Polish linguistics has always been more on the conservative, if not on the purist side, when it comes to evaluations of language change and linguistic borrowing. Such policies prevailed and persevered not without a reason. Poland had lost her independence at the turn of the 18 th century and fought it back as late as in 1918 only to 'lose' it again under the Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. For ages the protection of the native tongue was elevated to the rank of a national imperative. Guarding the integrity of the linguistic system meant attending at the same time to the unity of the nation.
For long language policy in Poland has been epitomized as language culture, sometimes also called culture of the word (e.g. Buttler et al. 1971, Pisarek and Zgółkowa eds, 1995; cf. Sprachkultur in German), and exercised as a form of standardization policy with a 'high' mission. As a result, it was always vested in ideational and rhetorical values of prestigious © Anna Duszak. Not for citation or distribution without permission of the author.
8 written texts, the propagation of which was done on the verge of a prescriptive rigor. Due to such priorities, language culture was practically limited to issues in grammatical correctness and style coherence. Within this framework interlingual borrowings were always severely scrutinized for rational use (cf. Daneš', 1987 , distinction between rational and non-rational motivations behind linguistic borrowing), and preference was normally given to revitalization through native resources (e.g. Walczak 1995 
High -and low -context communications in Poland
Prior to the changes initiated in the late 1980's, Poland had her own version of "high"-and 
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The high variety, an "official variant" of Polish (Walczak 1994) , always had a prestige function connoting the possession of appreciable social, intellectual and communicative skills by the user. On the other hand, however, "low-context" practices were highly valued in the social consciousness by implementing the ideology of "involvement" (on the concept of "culture of involvement" see e.g. Wierzbicka 1991). We may say therefore that in Poland, despite the "official" prestige of "high" values, the axiological vectoring in the social life was always away from psychological distance and communicative indirectness and towards psychological proximity and verbal directness. A passage of rites was celebrated in a drinking ritual comparable to the German Bruderschaft tradition. It involved a change of address forms from the pronouns of "power" (Pan/Pani) to the pronoun of "solidarity" (ty), and heralded the onset of a new mode of communication between the partners concerned.
High-context varieties of Polish included first of all the language of science with its "idealization" of knowledge and the imperative of a "difficult" text. Some form of intellectualization was also characteristic of the language of politics and of institutional discourses in general, including here the typical bureaucratic jargon. Bralczyk (2003: 18) , for instance, argues that political texts of the communist epoch resembled academic texts: the use of difficult language, terminology and syntax was to show the writer's competence and claim credibility. The language of politics was placed towards the "official" pole, next to such prestigious varieties as language of science or language of law (Walczak 1994: 20) , even though it was often described derogatorily as newspeak (the Polish term nowomowa is attributed to Głowiński, e.g. 1990) and denounced as pompous, ceremonial, schematized and evaluative, with axiology replacing semantics.
Challenge to the language of politics came in the 80's along with a challenge to the political system itself. The overthrow of communism was celebrated as a possibility to create a new political reality and a "real" tool for social dialogue. Quite naturally therefore people emotional stupor in a society that is increasingly exposed to aggressive behaviors and aggressive language. In a similar vein Gajda (2000: 26) and "academic culture", and in a steady lowering of (public and private) norms of speaking (Lubaś 2000: 86) .
Many linguists are concerned about the emergent levelling of styles. They fear loss of standards and drop in the social sensitivity to core values, such as truth and falsehood, if not a general "decomposition" of the Polish language. In political discourse, as Bralczyk implies (2003:70) , this produces a "catch-22 situation". On the one hand, politicians may be talking in a "regular" language and, on the other, people may start talking the way politicians do. The new language of politics may be closer to the man in the street type of talking. At the same time, however, it falls short of the social expectation that public discourses create norms and standards. Gajda (2000: 22, 24) , in turn, speaks about a "linguistic terrorism of the media", in which he sees a threat to the balanced co-existence of language and culture. According to him media is a stylistic (discursive) "melting pot" of contemporary Polish that "erodes" the language through dissemination of careless, common and vulgar patterns of speech. Polish linguistics cherished theory more than practical observation, as a result downgrading empirical discourse studies, or the social teaching of verbal skills, for that matter.
Conclusions
Poland is a culture of spontaneity verging on unruliness; it is a culture of complaint with a strongly developed sense of self-victimization; it is a culture with a sense of pride and a sense of guilt, a ceremonial respect for high values and a natural inclination for cordiality and simplicity. The post-communist realities have repositioned the traditional values, sentiments and practices, leaving some spaces in disarray and in need of revaluation. In many public and academic discussions the new changes resonate with a low tone of ambivalent, if not critical judgement.
For many the attitudes of negation grew from thwarted expectations that people linked, somewhat naively perhaps, with the rebuilding of the social order. Freedom and democracy did not cleanse political discourses from manipulation and small totalitarian worlds took place of the old big one (Bralczyk 2003: 75) . In post-war communist Poland attitudes to politics and attitudes to language of politics resided in a simple distinction: us (the society) and them (the communist regime). Talking politics was a ritual of solidarity, a part of which was to hint Comparisons with political discourses in more stable democracies are also needed to put the Polish political squabbles in a perspective.
On the whole, I would argue for a cross-cultural and a discourse analytical view as a most promising way of relating the Polish data to the evidence coming from other languages and cultures. It is another issue how to remove skepticism towards the study of such 'low' or non-
